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Ethics and Humanity is a collection of eleven new essays, all written in tribute to the 
work of Jonathan Glover, along with a brief biography (written by Alan Ryan), along 
with a nearly fifty-page response from Glover himself to each of the essays.  The essays 
cover most of the central topics that have engaged Glover’s forty-plus year career, 
including war, bioethics, torture, moral psychology, and the history of human violence 
and atrocity that was made central in 1999’s Humanity.  The contributors include the 
three co-editors, along with a stellar lineup of major philosophers including Peter 
Singer, Martha Nussbaum, Onora O’Neill, and John Harris.  There is an inherent 
difficulty in reviewing a collection of essays, namely that it becomes hard to give 
adequate consideration of a broad range of approaches and arguments in the body of a 
book review, but that difficulty is increased when the essays are presented so lovingly 
in tribute to a single figure.  There is a sense of warmth and philosophical community 
to all of these essays that is not always present in tribute volumes and festschriften.  
Several of the essays end with very personal postscripts from the authors describing the 
kindness of Professor Glover, and it is difficult to do the feeling of love, which 
pervades the book, justice in a short review, but I will try to hit the key points here.  I 
will not address each essay in detail, but begin with a summary of each before moving 
in a more critical direction with some comments and criticisms. 
 
Section One, “Torture”, features only one essay, “What Can We Do About Torture?” 
by James Griffin, a long-time colleague of Glover’s at Oxford.  Griffin addresses a 
central concern in Glover’s ethical thought: the limits on what human beings should be 
allowed, ethically, to do to her fellow human beings.  The limits are tested, for Griffin,  
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by the use of interrogational torture and an answer is ultimately not found: Griffin 
argues that torture could be justified only by a “principled torture” (and not by the 
current defenses of torture utilized by legal theorists and moral philosophers), which is 
not available to us.   
 
Section Two, “War”, addresses issues in Just War theory, following Glover’s own 
endeavors into the topic in 1977’s Causing Death and Saving Lives and revisited in 
1999’s Humanity.  Thomas Hurka and Jeff McMahan, both of whom have contributed 
much to the current understanding of Just War Theory, each offer essays that survey 
Glover’s view on the topic while presenting their own nuanced approaches to the status 
quo of Just War thinking.  Hurka analyzes the consequentialism that underlies 
traditional Just War theory, and notes the tensions that arise from Glover’s own 
consequentialist leanings and how his view differs from the traditional versions.  This 
theme, of Glover as an anti-doctrinal or non-traditional consequentialist, recurs 
throughout the essays in the book.  McMahan’s essay addresses the issue of 
humanitarian intervention as just cause for war, considering the problems of consent, 
proportionality, and obligation for defenders of humanitarian intervention.  Most 
notable in McMahan’s essay is the possibility that humanitarian interventions might be 
more obligatory than traditionally thought, and that intervening nations might be 
obligated to put their soldiers at risk far more than they have done in the past.  This 
claim is certainly in line with McMahan’s recent work on war, including 2009’s Killing 
In War (Oxford University Press). 
 
Section Three, “Ethics, Truth, and Belief”, offers the most variety of the sections, and is 
also home to some of the most interesting moments in the collection.  In “Humanity and 
the Perils of Perniciously Politicized Science,” N. Ann Davis explores the 
consequences of capitalism and Neoliberalism on the truth-seeking nature of science, 
and worries that knowledge for the sake of truth has been replaced with a model of 
knowledge as financial commodity.  Although the general concept of the chapter seems 
only tangentially related to issues in Humanity (namely, the ability to de-politicize 
ourselves in times of social, moral, and intellectual conflict), Davis draws parallels 
between the policies that effect scientific research and other public policy issues.  
Davis’s essay is also the most political and polemical, while also being the most 
broadly applicable.  Allen Buchanan’s “Social Moral Epistemology and the Tasks of 
Ethics” might be the best summation of Glover’s work to appear in the volume, and 
Buchanan distills the central theses of Humanity down handily.  Buchanan is 
sympathetic to Glover’s overall project, but raises doubts about how his attempt to 
incorporate moral psychology into ethics can succeed without the inclusion of a more 
expansive social moral epistemology (the epistemology of institutions and the beliefs of 
social groups).  Richard Keshen’s contribution explores the epistemic problems of 
reasonable disagreement and the ‘strains of dialogue,’ and ends on a pessimistic (or, at 
least, not-optimistic) note: our moral psychology might be too fraught with antagonism 
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and small-mindedness for there to be reasonable hope to resolve dialogical 
disagreements. 
 
Section Four, “Bioethics and Beyond,” addresses Glover’s pioneering work in the field 
of bioethics.  Onora O’Neill’s “Humanity and Hyper-Regulation: From Nuremberg to 
Helsinki” addresses problems found in implemented informed consent and what 
O’Neill sees as the overreaching of consent codes post-Nuremberg.  John Harris’s 
“Transhumanity: A Moral Vision of the Twenty-First Century” considers the moral and 
biological consequences of the creation of “humanimals,” creatures with mixed human 
and animal components.  In his own way, Harris blends Glover’s work in bioethics 
(What Sort of People Should There Be?) with the questions he addresses in Humanity 
and, in the most broad way possible, reconsiders some of the fundamental questions of 
philosophy and humanity. 
 
Section Five, “Some Silences in Humanity,” addresses three major gaps in Glover’s 
central argument in Humanity.  Roger Crisp’s essay “The Foundations of Humanity”, 
the shortest in the volume, challenges Glover’s claim that the twentieth century has 
seen a decline in the acceptance of the ‘moral law’ and raises concerns about Glover’s 
own apparent moral skepticism for the presumption of moral philosophy in general.  
Crisp’s attack is the most meta-ethical to appear in the book, and renews some crucial 
questions for any moral theory.  Peter Singer’s “Bystanders to Poverty” resurrects one 
of Singer’s most well known arguments (the drowning child argument from “Famine, 
Affluence and Morality”) against Glover’s own claims about the obligations of 
humanity.  It is a crucial point he raises-Glover himself rejects the acts and omissions 
doctrine, and never defends a strong obligation to provide basic aid to a fellow human 
being in peril, but this seems to clash with the core tenets of his defense of humanity as 
such.  If we should be concerned with preventing future genocides, why should we not 
also be concerned with helping prevent massive death due to disease and starvation?  
Singer notes that Glover’s careful moral history of the twentieth century completely 
ignores the massive amount of death and suffering caused by famine, pestilence, and 
disease that may have been preventable but for the inaction of those wealthier nations 
to offer the resources to prevent it.  Since Glover argues that the bystanders to Nazi 
genocide were morally culpable for their inaction, it would be morally inconsistent to 
claim that wealthy individuals and societies are any less culpable for standing idly by as 
poor nations suffer from starvation and disease.  Martha Nussbaum’s “Compassion: 
Human and Animal” concludes the essays on Glover’s work by considering the role of 
compassion and related moral emotions as they present themselves in animals, and by 
focusing on human ‘anthropodenial’ (the implicit denial by humans that we are 
animals) and the human moral and social weaknesses that may be lacking in other 
members of the animal kingdom.  As Nussbaum succinctly puts it, “Human compassion 
is diseased” (203) and a long look at the psychological behavior of animals might 
provide us with an antidote for our own moral failings.  And, as is customary in 
Nussbaum’s works, there is a rich world of examples from literature (Rousseau, Walt 
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Whitman, Theodor Fontane, Tolstoy) and horrifying case studies (her discussion of a 
2002 Hindu pogrom against Muslim women is chilling) to elucidate her philosophical 
point.  Despite her pessimistic claims about human compassion, Nussbaum considers 
her argument to be locked arm-in-arm with Glover’s, and closes with a Glover-like 
claim that we need to better understand our place in the animal world to make ourselves 
all the better. 
 
After Alan Ryan’s thoughtful biographical essay on Glover’s life and work, Glover 
himself gets the last word, in the form of a series of detailed responses to each of the 
articles and a final, personal, reflection on family, friends, colleagues, and philosophy.  
Much could be said about Glover’s replies, but I will leave most of it unsaid.  What I 
will note, however, is an interesting tension that lingers over Glover’s response to 
Griffin’s article on torture.  Both Glover and Griffin want to condemn torture, and want 
to repudiate the practice of torture, but neither is willing to truly close the door on it as 
a practice.  Both (regretfully, it seems) stop short of an absolute prohibition on torture.  
This reflects back to Crisp’s analysis of Glover’s meta-ethics, and suggests that 
whatever sense of foundation Glover has for his moral theory is, at best, tenuous.  This, 
at the very least, is an interesting consequence of the essays. 
 
I will close with a few general thoughts on the essays themselves, covering both 
content, scope, and engagement with Glover’s own work.   
 
1. At the beginning of his chapter on war in Causing Death and Saving 
Lives, Glover warns about what happens when “we compartmentalize our 
thinking, finding it hard to think about both the large scale and the small scale in 
the proper perspective”. The authors of these essays have done an excellent job 
of heeding his warning, and while all of them utilize detailed philosophical 
arguments, they have avoided ‘compartmentalized thinking.’  Glover has, 
interestingly, changed his philosophical style from his earlier works (the 
thought-experiments present in Causing Death and Saving Lives) to his more 
recent one (the real-life examples and cases, and the influence of empirical 
moral psychology found in Humanity) and his commentators tackle both 
stylistic phases.  Glover was one of the figures present at the birth of ‘applied 
ethics’ and both he, and his commentators, nicely examine the places where 
ethics collides with medicine, law, epistemology, and politics with clarity and 
precision.  In this way, the influence of Glover on the authors is quite apparent, 
in that the work is often tightly focused without becoming overly 
‘compartmentalized’. 
 
2. While most of the authors agree with Glover’s main goals (it would be 
hard to reject the core theses of Humanity with a straight face), the most critical 
take in the book probably comes from Allen Buchanan.  For Buchanan, the 
central thesis in Humanity is that moral psychology and moral education need to 
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be cultivated to avoid the kinds of vices that have led to the atrocities of the 
twentieth century.  The problem with this view, claims Buchanan, is that Glover 
does not offer enough to ensure his theoretical proposals will take root.  His 
view is insufficiently empirical and leaves out a crucial factor-the role of social 
institutions on the development of moral-epistemic frameworks.  Buchanan 
demands a deeper examination of social moral epistemology, based on the 
belief that epistemic-moral beliefs are more deeply rooted in institutional 
frameworks than in individual moral psychology.  The worry that lingers over 
Buchanan’s counter-proposal is that institutions may not the mechanism that 
fully implants epistemic-moral beliefs, and that he is short-changing individual 
moral psychology.   I think that some combination of social moral epistemology 
and empirical moral psychology will be necessary to help eradicate the moral 
failings that lead to human atrocities.  And, maybe more pessimistically, I worry 
that these failings may not be adequately correctible, although I would hope not. 
 
3. The most interesting point to arise in these essays, in my eyes, is 
Buchanan’s discussion of Glover’s view as a ‘consequentialist virtue ethics.’  
This isn’t merely an outside assessment of the view-Buchanan notes that Glover 
self-describes his approach in Humanity as such.  Given his apparent pessimism 
about the axiomatic certainty of his own moral views (as evidenced in both 
Crisp’s essay and Glover’s reply to Griffin), continuing to describe Glover as a 
‘consequentialist’ might be to overstate things a bit.  His attempt to merge an 
adequate moral psychology into a realistic understanding of virtue fits well both 
in the current philosophical worldview, with strong emphases on cross-
disciplinary research and ‘experimental philosophy’, as well as with an older 
claim by G.E.M. Anscombe (in “Modern Moral Philosophy”) that we are faced 
with a gap “which needs to be filled by an account of human nature, human 
action, the type of characteristic a virtue is, and above all of human 
‘flourishing’.” The merging of virtue ethics with other forms of moral theory is 
nothing new (Rosalind Hursthouse does something like this in On Virtue Ethics, 
for instance), but the development of a virtue-consequentialism with an eye 
towards overall human welfare is, at the very least, worth looking more deeply 
into. 
 
4. In a section on the oversights of Humanity, I was somewhat surprised 
that no discussion was ever broached by noted animal welfare defender Peter 
Singer about the treatment of animals by humankind.  Similarly, in Martha 
Nussbaum’s discussion of the role of animal emotion and empathy, little is said 
about human attitudes towards animals, instead focusing on human ignorance of 
what animal minds are like.  It would be interesting to consider, from the 
perspective of Buchanan’s social moral epistemology, how attitudes towards 
animals and their consequent treatment might impact the development of virtues 
and vices.  At the very least, we might worry that Kant was right that “a person 
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who already displays such cruelty to animals is also no less hardened towards 
men” (Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, p.212), and that this might impact the goals of Humanity in practice.  
While I grant that Glover’s central goal is discuss the nature of human harms to 
other humans, it might be worth considering that our approaches towards non-
human creatures might be relevant here, particularly if we are truly 
‘anthropodeniers’, as is suggested by Frans de Waal (de Waal, Primates and 
Philosophers: How Morality Evolved, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2006) and echoed by Nussbaum’s essay. 
 
5. Most of the essays make at least passing mention of Glover’s character 
and personality, and all of the comments are of the same general type: that 
Jonathan Glover is a kind, giving, gentle, and thoughtful teacher, mentor, 
colleague, friend, and person.  Over the last few years, Eric Schwitzgebel and 
his colleagues have been collecting data that seems to support the claim that 
ethicists are no more ethical in their actions (understood in several different 
contexts) than non-ethicists (See, for example, Schwitzgebel and Rust, “The 
Moral Behavior of Ethicists: Peer Opinion”, Mind 2009, 118).  In his essay, Jeff 
McMahan notes that philosophers are often wary of utilitarians because they are 
reputed to forego typical human kindnesses for the sake of the greater good, but 
Glover clearly transcends both the Schwitzgebel thesis and the anti-utilitarian 
bias.  I’m not sure how to take Schwitzgebel’s research on the whole, but if it is 
the case that ethicists generally, and utilitarians particularly, are less likely to act 
ethically, Jonathan Glover would appear to be a glaring exception to the rule.  
Obviously, this doesn’t disprove either claim, but it says volumes about the man 
whose life and work is being celebrated here. 
 
Ethics and Humanity is an excellent collection of original essays on Glover’s work.  
While the material presented is not likely to be easily accessible to typical 
undergraduates without a background in ethics, it would serve as an excellent edition to 
any syllabus on applied ethics, the ethics of war and torture, bioethics, or the political 
philosophy of Humanity, or any graduate course on recent philosophical work in ethics.  
Anyone interested in Glover’s work should consider it required reading, as well as 
those whose interests range across the spectrum of value theory in general.  It serves as 
a fitting tribute to an excellent philosopher whose work continues to challenge our 
concept of what it is to be human. 
 
 
 
 
